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THIRD-PARTY HARMS, CONGRESSIONAL STATUTES ACCOMMODATING 






Those disappointed with the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), are seeking ways to otherwise limit the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, dissenting 
in Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2787, 2790 n.8, 2802 n.25 (2014), wrote that when a 
statute seeks to accommodate a claimant’s religious beliefs or practices there must 
be no detrimental effect on third parties who do not share those beliefs. Although it 
is unclear whether Justice Ginsburg was relying on the Establishment Clause as 
imposing this categorical restraint on the authority of Congress,1 some commentators 
argue that her thinking necessarily rests on the Establishment Clause.2 It is of some 
importance whether these commentators are correct about the rule of third-party 
harm being derived from the Establishment Clause. Although Justice Samuel Alito 
for the Supreme Court in Hobby Lobby squarely rejected the argument that third-
party harms categorically defeat requests for accommodations under RFRA, id. at 
2781 n.37, he did not consider the Establishment Clause. Indeed, the Government 
did not argue it. So these commentators promoting the third-party harm rule are able 
to maintain that nothing in Hobby Lobby contradicts their reliance on the 
Establishment Clause. The commentators would, of course, like to have Justice 
Ginsburg on their side. In her recent concurrence in Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 
867 (2015), Justice Ginsburg reiterated her view that substantial third-party harms 
were a categorical limitation on statutory religious accommodations, but she did not 
clarify if her rule was derived from the Establishment Clause or was otherwise a 
limitation implicit in the statutory claim. 
Is Congress’s authority to accommodate a religious belief or practice 
constrained by the Establishment Clause, which is said by some commentators to 
require the government to always refrain from granting a statutory exemption if it 




                                                          
1 See Kevin Walsh, Did Justice Ginsburg endorse the Establishment Clause third-party burdens 
argument in Holt v. Hobbs?, http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2015/01/did-justice-
ginsburg-endorse-the-establishment-clause-third-party-burdens-argument-in-holt-v-hobbs-.html. 




SUMMARY OF POINTS DISCUSSED 
 
1.  The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that when a regulation or tax imposes 
a burden on a religious practice of an individual or organization, it is free to lift that 
burden by providing an exemption. This is what Congress has done in adopting RFRA 
and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). To exempt 
religious exercise from a regulatory or tax burden has the effect of leaving religion 
alone. And for the government to leave religion alone does not establish a religion. 
In a long list of the Supreme Court’s cases there has been a challenge to the 
constitutionality of a statutory religious exemption. The Court has consistently 
rejected the argument that a religious exemption is violative the Establishment 
Clause. Only in one such case has the Establishment Clause said to have been 
violated, namely Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985). The statute 
in Caldor, however, was singular in that it created an “unyielding” preference for a 
particular religious observance, Sabbath rest, and thereby completely disregarded 
the costs borne by others. RFRA and RLUIPA are not unyielding but operate in a 
manner that accounts for the circumstances of others. These two statutes require 
officials to engage in case-specific interest balancing. Any costs falling on third parties 
are weighed in the balance, along with other relevant considerations, all as 
prescribed, before a determination is made whether to allow the religious 
accommodation. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37. RFRA and RLUIPA do not 
violate the Establishment Clause. 
 
2.  Prerequisite to the operation of any rule of third-party harm is a showing that the 
accommodation of a given religious observance or practice actually causes a harm to 
fall on others. For example, under the Affordable Care Act, effective January 1, 2013, 
the Government imposed a regulatory burden on employers of more than fifty 
persons, and it conferred a corresponding benefit on their employees. In Hobby Lobby, 
two of those employers invoked RFRA seeking an accommodation. RFRA kept the 
burden from falling on the employers and thereby kept the benefit vesting in certain 
employees. The effect of the two governmental actions was no net change for anyone, 
economically or religiously. The employers and employees are back to where they 
started. To consider one of these actions without considering the other, as some 
commentators do,3 is to ignore the full context in which the dispute arose. This is the 
baseline problem of measuring burdens/benefits under the Establishment Clause. In 
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), the proper baseline 
to measure burden/benefit is just before the effective date of the initial regulation. By 
that measure, in Hobby Lobby there was never a “benefit” vested in the employees 
that was later “taken away” by the operation of RFRA. 
 
                                                          
3 See N. Tebbe, R. Schragger & M. Schwartzman, Hobby Lobby and the Establishment Clause, Part 




 3.  Proponents of a third-party harm rule concede that the Establishment Clause is 
structural in nature.4 Rather than operating as an individual right which is subject 
to balancing, the Constitution’s structural provisions operate to distribute and 
delimit the powers and duties of a government of limited, delegated powers. Familiar 
structural limits are separation of powers and federalism. By its terms, the 
Establishment Clause acts as a denial of power, otherwise vested in Congress, to 
“make . . . law respecting an establishment of religion.” Structural limits, when 
applicable, are categorical, such as the limits on a federal court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction. A federal court either has subject matter jurisdiction or it does not; there 
is no balancing between competing interests. In like manner, the Establishment 
Clause is regarded by the federal judiciary as categorical in its operation, separating 
church and government. Either the church-state boundary is violated or it is not. 
There is no such thing as a balancing test with the Establishment Clause. Yet a rule 
based on the substantiality of third-party harms necessitates such talk by its 
proponents. Such harms might be a little incurred or greatly incurred, small injuries 
or big injuries, substantial or trivial in the burden to be borne. Injuries of this sort 
are in the nature of those protected by an individual rights clause, not injuries 




Point One: For Government to leave religion alone is not to establish a 
religion. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that when a government 
regulation or tax imposes a burden on a religious observance or practice of an 
individual or organization, it is free to lift that burden by providing a religious 
exemption. This is what Congress has done in adopting the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. To 
exempt religious exercise from a regulatory or tax burden has the effect of leaving 
religion alone. And for the government to leave religion alone is not to establish a 
religion.  
The leading case is Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 
(1987), in which the Court upheld a statutory exemption in Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012), that permits religious organizations 
to prefer employees of like-minded faith. 483 U.S. at 332 n.9. Mayson, a building 
custodian employed at a gymnasium operated by the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints, was discharged when he ceased to be a church member in good 
standing. The Court began by reaffirming that the Establishment Clause did not 
mean that government must be indifferent to religion, but aims at government not 
“act[ing] with the intent of promoting a particular point of view in religious matters.” 
                                                          
4 See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the Contraception 




Id. at 335. The Title VII exemption, however, was not an instance of government 
“abandoning neutrality,” for “it is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate” a 
regulatory burden leaving religious organizations free “to define and carry out their 
religious missions,” as they see fit. Id. 
 In addition to Amos, the Court has on five other occasions turned back an 
Establishment Clause challenge to a religious exemption. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 
U.S. 709 (2005) (Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, which 
accommodates religious observance by prison inmates, does not violate 
Establishment Clause); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (religious 
exemption from military draft for those opposing all war does not violate 
Establishment Clause); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (property tax 
exemptions for religious organizations do not violate Establishment Clause); Zorach 
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (local public school district’s release of students from 
state compulsory education law to enable them to attend religion classes off the public 
school grounds does not violate Establishment Clause); The Selective Draft Law 
Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (military draft exemption for clergy, seminarians, and 
pacifists does not violate Establishment Clause). 
 A.  Estate of Thornton v. Caldor is Distinguishable. 
 In only one of the Court’s religious exemption cases has a shift in burden been 
a factor in determining that the Establishment Clause was violated, namely Estate 
of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985). But Caldor entailed a unique 
accommodation that was unlike anything in RFRA or RLUIPA. 
 In Caldor, Connecticut had amended its laws to permit more retail stores to be 
open on Sunday. Out of concern for those who would now be pressured to work on 
their Sabbath, the state adopted a law to help employees who desired to remain 
observant. The statute read: “No person who states that a particular day of the week 
is observed as his Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on such day.” Id. 
at 706. Donald Thornton was an employee for Caldor, Inc., a department store. He 
was a Presbyterian and observed Sunday as his Sabbath. When Caldor Department 
Stores began opening on Sunday, Thornton worked Sundays once or twice a month. 
He later invoked the Connecticut statute seeking no work on Sunday. Caldor resisted 
and a lawsuit was filed on Thornton’s behalf by the State Board of Mediation. Id. at 
705-07. Caldor argued that the Connecticut statute violated the Establishment 
Clause, and the Court agreed. Id. at 707, 710-11. 
  The Court in Caldor noted that the “statute arms Sabbath observers with an 
absolute and unqualified right not to work on whatever day they designated as their 
Sabbath.” Id. at 709 (footnote omitted). The statute failed to account for what an 
employer was to do “if a high percentage of an employer’s workforce asserts rights to 
the same Sabbath.” Id. The law also granted an “unyielding weighting in favor of 
Sabbath observers over all other interests.” Id. at 710. For example, coworkers with 
more seniority may want weekends off because those are the same days a spouse is 
not working. Id. at 710 n.9. All this was problematic “[u]nder the Religion Clauses,” 
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the Court reasoned, not because of cost-shifting, but because “government . . . must 
take pains not to compel people to act in the name of any religion.” Id. at 708. It was 
not the business expense as such, but that Caldor and other employees were being 
compelled to act in the name of Thornton’s conviction about keeping the Sabbath holy. 
 The Court also noted that Thornton’s religious burden was caused by the 
demands of the private retail sector. The Connecticut law, in response to the 
anticipated employee demands, empowered Thornton to call on the state’s assistance 
to secure the observance of his Sabbath. Id. at 709. Caldor is thus unlike Amos, the 
latter being an exemption that merely lifted a government burden that was imposed 
by that same government. The Connecticut statute, in contrast, spurred government 
into taking a side as between two private-sector disputants. It did so by arming 
Thornton with an affirmative legal right against others in the private sector. 
 It was in this context that the Court in Caldor said “a fundamental principle 
of the Religion Clauses” is that the First Amendment “gives no one the right to insist 
that in pursuit of their own interests others must conform their conduct to his own 
religious necessities.” Id. at 710 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
Clarification concerning limits on reach of this announced “fundamental principle” 
was needed and quickly came in two cases decided in the next two years.5 
      The first was Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136 
(1987). Hobbie was the third occasion for the Court to rule on the application of the 
Free Exercise Clause to an employee seeking benefits under a state’s unemployment 
compensation law.6 On each of these occasions, the state had denied benefits because 
the worker declined to take a job for which she was qualified. In Hobbie, the employee 
was discharged when she refused to work on Saturday, her Sabbath. 
 In reliance on Caldor’s “fundamental principle,” the employer in Hobbie argued 
that to compel accommodation of an employee’s Sabbath entailed a shift in burden to 
the employer and coworkers contrary to the Establishment Clause. Id. at 145. The 
Court not only rejected the employer’s argument, but began to cabin Caldor’s so-
called “fundamental principle”: 
In Thornton [v. Caldor], we . . . determined that the State’s “unyielding 
weighting in favor of Sabbath observers over all other interests . . . ha[d] 
a primary effect that impermissibly advance[d] a particular religious 
practice,” . . . and placed an unacceptable burden on employers and co-
workers because it provided no exceptions for special circumstances 
regardless of the hardship resulting from the mandatory 
accommodation. 
                                                          
5 It is not even clear whether the Caldor Court was attributing this “fundamental principle” to the 
Free Exercise Clause or the Establishment Clause. If the attribution was to the Free Exercise Clause, 
then the passage is simply irrelevant to the argument here that no-establishment principles are 
implicated. 
 6 The prior two cases were Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981), and Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
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Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 145 n.11 (internal citations omitted; brackets in original). Hobbie 
showed how narrow Caldor was. In lifting a religious burden, the statutory 
accommodation in Caldor favored the religious claimant unyieldingly or was 
absolute, thus entirely disregarding the interests of the employer and coworkers. 
That is not the case with RFRA/RLUIPA, which entail a balancing test familiar to 
free exercise law that takes into account the interests of others. 
      A few months later, the Amos Court also addressed the scope of the 
“fundamental principle” passage in Caldor. In Amos, a religious exemption in Title 
VII permitted religious organizations to prefer those of like-minded faith in 
employment. Mayson, a building custodian, claimed the statutory exemption shifted 
a burden to him resulting in loss of employment. Tracking the Caldor passage, 
Mayson argued that the exemption pressured him to conform his conduct to the 
religious necessities of others contrary to the Establishment Clause. The High Court 
disagreed: 
This is a very different case than Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. . . . . 
In Caldor, the Court struck down a Connecticut statute prohibiting an 
employer from requiring an employee to work on a day designated by 
the employee as his Sabbath. In effect, Connecticut had given the force 
of law to the employee’s designation of a Sabbath day and required 
accommodation by the employer regardless of the burden which that 
constituted for the employer or other employees. See Hobbie . . . 480 U.S. 
[at] 145 n.11. 
Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 n.15. The Court thus distinguished Caldor from Amos, and the 
issue raise by RFRA/RLUIPA is like that in Amos. The statute in Caldor favored the 
religious claimant absolutely, thus totally disregarding the interests of others in the 
private sector. As stated above in the context of Hobbie, RFRA/RLUIPA is not 
unyielding but requires interest balancing. 
 In Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005), the religious exemption was by 
operation of RLUIPA at a state correctional facility. Justice Ginsburg writing for the 
Court said that given RLUIPA’s “tak[ing] adequate account of the burdens [that] a 
requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries,” the statute met the 
strictures of the Establishment Clause. Id. at 720. Because RLUIPA was not 
unyielding to third-party considerations, a unanimous Court upheld its 
constitutionality. 
 In the Supreme Court’s penultimate encounter with RFRA, the government 
argued that it had satisfied its burden under the compelling interest test by claiming 
there was a need for uniform application of a controlled substances statute. See 
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 435-36 
(2006). That argument was rejected because that is not how RFRA operates. Rather, 
under RFRA the judiciary is charged with striking “sensible balances” that often lead 
to religious accommodations. RFRA assumes “the feasibility of case-by-case 
consideration of religious exemptions.” Id. at 436 (referencing Cutter). And both 
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RLUIPA in Cutter and RFRA in O Centro avoided implicating the Establishment 
Clause by their case-by-case interest balancing, as opposed to the “unyielding” 
preference statute struck down in Caldor. 
 From Hobbie, Amos, Cutter, and O Centro we have the factor that sets Caldor 
apart. The religious exemption in Caldor created an “unyielding” preference for a 
religious observance particular to some religions: Sabbath rest. RFRA/RLUIPA 
creates no absolute preference for religion, but sets up the familiar interest-balancing 
calculus of free exercise law. Accordingly, the Establishment Clause is not remotely 
triggered by the appearance or reality of third-party harms due to the operation 
RFRA or RLUIPA. 
 
 B.  Hobby Lobby footnote 37 and the rule of third-party harms. 
 In Hobby Lobby, the Government did not argue that RFRA, as applied, violated 
the Establishment Clause because it imposed third-party harm on some of the 
employees of Hobby Lobby Stores and Conestoga Wood Specialties. However, the 
Government did make a parallel argument, to wit:  That a burden on third parties, 
who did not share the religious beliefs of the RFRA claimants, categorically tipped 
the statute’s prescribed interest balancing against the employers. The Court 
thoroughly rejected that argument: 
[I]t could not reasonably be maintained that any burden on religious 
exercise, no matter how onerous and no matter how readily the 
government interest could be achieved through alternative means, is 
permissible under RFRA so long as the relevant legal obligation requires 
the religious adherent to confer a benefit on third parties. 
134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37. The Court went on to point out how easily the third-party 
harm argument is concocted: 
By framing any Government regulation as benefitting a third party, the 
Government could turn all regulations into entitlements to which 
nobody could object on religious grounds, rendering RFRA meaningless. 
Id. The Government’s categorical third-party burden argument, reject in Hobby 
Lobby, is nearly identical to the argument that the Establishment Clause is violated 
in the face of third-party harm. Having stiff-armed one such argument, we can safely 
predict the Court would do the same with the one under discussion here. 
 
 
Point Two:  The Baseline for Measuring Third-Party Harms. 
 Before asking if RFRA/RLUIPA impose a burden on third parties who do not 
share the same religious beliefs as the one claiming an accommodation, a prerequisite 
is that these third parties had a vested interest in the status or entitlement which 
they claim is now being “taken away” or harmed. 
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 Hobby Lobby provides a useful context. Under the Affordable Care Act, 
effective January 1, 2013, the government imposed a regulatory burden on employers 
of more than fifty persons, and it conferred a corresponding health-care benefit on 
their employees. If Hobby Lobby Stores and Conestoga Wood Specialties now invoke 
RFRA seeking an accommodation, it prevents the burden from falling on these 
employers and keeps the benefit from reaching their employees. The net effect of the 
two governmental actions is no change for anyone, economically or religiously. The 
employers and employees are back to where they started. To consider one of these 
actions without considering the other is to ignore the context in which the dispute 
arose. If the Government in Hobby Lobby had argued the Establishment Clause, the 
baseline for measuring the relevant burdens/benefits is just before the effective date 
of the ACA mandate. 
 In Hobby Lobby, the Government did not argue that imposing a “burden” on 
third-party employees violated the Establishment Clause. That was wise because 
given the baseline there was no “burden.” The Government also did not argue that 
providing a RFRA accommodation to the employers was a religious preference 
violative of the Establishment Clause. That too was wise because given the baseline 
there was no employer “benefit.” For the Government to exempt religion while 
imposing regulation on others similarly situated is to leave religion alone. And to 
leave religion alone is not a benefit and thus not an establishment. 
 Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra, note 4, at 371, claim that the controlling 
baseline in Hobby Lobby should be 1993, which is just before RFRA was enacted by 
Congress. But that choice is contrary to Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327 (1987). In Amos, the baseline was on the eve of the effective date of Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 337 (“[W]e find no persuasive evidence in 
the record before us that the Church’s ability to propagate its religious doctrine 
through the Gymnasium is any greater now than it was prior to the passage of the 
Civil Rights Act in 1964.”). This was the date just before a regulatory burden was 
first imposed on religious employers like the LDS Church. Congress amended Title 
VII in 1972, thereby lifting the relevant burden from religious employers. Id. at 332 
n.9. Accordingly, the 1972 amendment is the counterpart to RFRA in Hobby Lobby. 
Given the 1964 baseline used in Amos, the 1972 amendment was not a new “benefit” 
but was merely returning the LDS Church to its prior unregulated status on the eve 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Law. 
In Amos, it was the 1972 amendment that was attacked as violative of the 
Establishment Clause (id. at 335-37), and in Hobby Lobby it was RFRA that would 
be subjected to an Establishment Clause challenge by Gedicks & Van Tassell.  But 
that is the wrong baseline. The ACA mandate of January 1, 2013, is the counterpart 
to Title VII when first enacted in 1964. Both legislative acts (Title VII and ACA) 
altered the status quo ante from no regulatory burden on employers to imposing such 
a burden. So in a “before and after” comparison, the circumstances on the eve of the 
2013 ACA mandate and the 1964 Title VII are the “before,” which is to say they are 
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the baseline for comparing later burdens/benefits. That was the approach of the Amos 
Court, and the one that should be followed with RFRA/RLUIPA. 
Other commentators argue that in setting the baseline the Court should 
assume that health-care is universally available.7 (Universal coverage, of course, is 
not the actual state of affairs under the ACA.) If we are to assume a world where the 
default position is comprehensive health-care coverage, then it is a mere tautology 
that departure from that baseline because of a RFRA accommodation for Hobby 
Lobby Stores and Conestoga Wood Specialties is a “burden” for their employees. This 
assumption of universal health-care coverage for purposes of a baseline is, as 
explained in the prior paragraph, contrary to Amos.  
Why not assume a world where RFRA accommodations are universal? Then it 
is a mere tautology that that there is no “burden” on the employees because status 
quo ante is no health-care benefits. Indeed, we can make all sorts of fantasy 
assumptions and draw the baseline accordingly. What these commentators have 
forgotten is that the baseline is drawn to serve the principles of the Establishment 
Clause. That is what guided the Court in Amos, and that is what should guide us 
here. For government to leave religion alone is not to establish a religion. 
 
Point Three:  The Establishment Clause operates categorically, not 
according to the balancing-of-interests invited by a rule of third-party 
harms, thus suggesting that the Clause is not implicated. 
 Gedicks & Van Tassell concede that the Establishment Clause is “a structural 
bar on government action rather than a guarantee of personal rights.  [Thus, 
v]iolations cannot be waived by the parties or balanced away by weightier private or 
government interests, as can violations of the Free Exercise Clause.” Gedicks & 
Tassell, supra note 4, at 347. They are right about that.8 However, they seem not to 
realize that a structural Establishment Clause undermines their core thesis which is 
that at some point the cost-shifting becomes so great that “the scales tip” against a 
religious exemption’s validity under that Clause. Id. at 363-71. As if the case law 
under the Establishment Clause was not complex enough, these commentators would 
                                                          
7 See N. Tebbe, R. Schragger & M. Schwartzman, Hobby Lobby and the Establishment Clause, Part 
II: What Counts As A Burden on Employees?  http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/12/hobby-lobby-and-
establishment-clause.html  
8 Unlike individual constitutional rights, such as free speech or free exercise, which are not 
absolute but subject to balancing, the Establishment Clause has been applied like a structural clause 
and thus operates categorically. See Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a Structural 
Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1998); Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause 
as a Structural Restraint: Validations and Ramifications, 18 J. LAW & POLITICS (UVA) 445 (2002). 
When structural in nature the Establishment Clause negates power that otherwise might be thought 
to have been delegated to government. By its terms, it denies to Congress power to “make . . . law 
respecting an establishment,” thereby separating church and government. U.S. CONST. Amend. 1. As 
with power-delegating and power-negating clauses in the Constitution, when the restraint on power 
that is the Establishment Clause is exceeded there is no balancing. Either the government has 
exceeded its power or it has not, much as with a federal court’s subject matter jurisdiction. 
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turn the Clause into an occasion for Lochner-era balancing of economic interests. Id. 
at 375-78 (a little economic cost-shifting is constitutionally valid, but at some juncture 
a Federal judge is to somehow know when too many dollars tote up to the “tipping 
point” against RFRA). 
 In the few cases that have paid attention to burden shifting, such as Caldor, 
the Court did so because the law in question granted an “unyielding weighting in 
favor of [religious] observers over all other interests.” 472 U.S. at 710. And such a 
shift in burden was problematic “[u]nder the Religion Clauses,” not because of the 
total dollars involved in the shift, but because “government . . . must take pains not 
to compel people to act in the name of any religion.” Id. at 708. So it was not the 
money as such that is the relevant offense or harm, but that a private-sector 
employer, a department store, was being compelled by the state to act in the name of 
someone else’s religion. The Caldor Court thought that set of facts had the “primary 
effect” of advancing “a particular religious practice.” Id. at 710. A party being 
compelled by an unyielding law to act in the name of another’s religious creed does 
actually have the ring of an Establishment Clause rule. It sounds like a fix rule; when 
applicable it applies unyieldingly. It is something a categorical Establishment Clause 
can, in the right case, get its teeth into, unlike the balancing test engaged in by 
Gedicks & Van Tassell. 
From the outset of the litigation over the contraceptive mandate, the 
Government conceded that, due to the unassailable right to religious freedom, 
churches and their integrated auxiliaries should be exempt from the mandate. But a 
woman working for a church suffers the same unrealized-benefit “loss” as does a 
woman working for Conestoga Wood Specialties or Hobby Lobby Stores.9 To avoid 
that comparison, commentators pressed their argument hardest when it came to 
business entities with many employees. See Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 4, at 
380-82. But there is no principled basis for doing so. The issue is not how large is the 
total dollar amount of a given shift in the cost of contraceptives, for the Establishment 
Clause operates categorically rather than as a balancing test. 
 Under Point One, supra, there is collected six Supreme Court cases where a 
religious accommodation by the Government was unsuccessfully attacked as a 
“religious preference” violative of the Establishment Clause.10 Proponents of the 
                                                          
9 Gedicks & Van Tassell make the Establishment Clause claim that it would be unconstitutional 
to exempt religious nonprofit and for-profit organizations, except for churches and their integrated 
auxiliaries. See, supra, note 4 at 380-81. They want to avoid arguing that it is unconstitutional as to 
churches, for that is too improbable. So they indulge in speculation about the contraceptive use by 
employees of churches who teach that contraception, or emergency contraception, is morally 
prohibited. Id. (unfounded speculation that employees of such churches “are overwhelmingly likely to 
share their anti-contraception views”). See also, id. at 381 (unfounded speculation that many 
employees of nonprofit religious organizations that are not churches do not share their employer’s 
views on contraception). 
10 For ease of reference, the cases are again collected here: Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) 
(Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, which accommodates religious observance by 
prison inmates, does not violate Establishment Clause); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 
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third-party harm rule dismiss these cases because in their judgment the shift in cost 
is too small or is diffused over an unidentifiable class. The commentators claim that 
they are only concerned when the shift in cost is to an identifiable group of third 
parties, as in Amos, Hobbie, and Hobby Lobby. Diffusion of the injury among many 
might make a difference for legal doctrines like standing, but it is surely irrelevant 
to the Establishment Clause. Again, the focus of the Clause is on whether the law in 
question has transgressed the boundary between church and government. Either it 
has or it has not; no balancing of harms and benefits. If it has cross the boundary, it 
is outright unconstitutional. It is of no moment that the resulting burden falls on a 
known class or is spread over a wide and diffuse population. Once again, the 
proponents of the rule of third-party harm seem unaware of the implications of the 




In a half-dozen cases the U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality 
of a religious exemption as not violative of the Establishment Clause: Cutter, Amos, 
Gillette, Walz, Zorach, The Selective Draft Law Cases. In some of these cases there 
was burden-shifting to identifiable third parties, but the shift made no difference in 
the Court’s application of the Establishment Clause. In the one case where the Court 
did strike down a statute accommodating religion, Caldor, the offending legislation 
created an absolute right to be accommodated, thereby compelling a private-sector 
employer to act in conformity with a religious tenet of an employee. Within two years 
of that holding, the Court twice took special care that Caldor be confined to its facts. 
Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 n.15; Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 145 n.11. Neither RFRA nor RLUIPA 
suffers from being an “unyielding” preference such that one in the private sector is 
compelled by law to follow the religious practice of another. 




Submitted by:          
 
CARL H. ESBECK                         
R.B. Price Professor and Isabelle Wade & Paul C. Lyda Professor of Law Emeritus 
                                                          
483 U.S. 327 (1987) (exemption for religious employers in employment nondiscrimination act is not a 
religious preference violative of Establishment Clause); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) 
(religious exemption from military draft for those opposing all war does not violate Establishment 
Clause); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (property tax exemptions for religious 
organizations do not violate Establishment Clause); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (local 
public school district’s release of students from state compulsory education law to enable them to 
attend religion classes off the public school grounds does not violate Establishment Clause); The 
Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918) (military draft exemption for clergy, seminarians, and 
pacifists does not violate Establishment Clause).  
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